

























Why do some mineral-rich countries channel their
resources into sustainable economic and social policies,
while others do not? What are the factors that impede
resource-rich countries in the South from investing more
of their wealth in social development? Can boosting
mineral rents open fiscal space for transformative social
policies in a context that is also conducive to democracy,
social inclusion and economic development? These are
some of the questions guiding research under a project
at the United Nations Research Institute for Social
Development (UNRISD), Financing Social Policy in
Mineral-Rich Countries, which is part of the second stage
of  a broader inquiry, initiated in 2006, Financing Social
Policy (see UNRISD Conference News No. 18, 2007).
The umbrella project, funded by the Ford Foundation,
explores the developmental impact associated with
specific financing techniques and revenue resources such
as taxation, social insurance contributions, social and
pension funds, remittances, aid and the topic of this
issue of  Conference News: mineral rents.
In 2007, UNRISD commissioned eight papers on the
theme of financing social policy through mineral rents,
which included four conceptual papers and four case
studies on Chile, Indonesia, Nigeria and Norway. These
papers were presented during a two-day workshop in
Geneva on 24–25 April 2008. The workshop brought
together commissioned authors as well as academics
and experts from the United Nations, including staff
from the International Labour Organization (ILO) and
the United Nations Conference on Trade and
Development (UNCTAD).
In his opening remarks, UNRISD Director Thandika
Mkandawire welcomed participants and introduced the
UNRISD research programme on Social Policy and
Development. This programme is built on the
recognition that social policy has multiple roles that go
beyond social protection and poverty reduction,
simultaneously affecting production, redistribution and
gender as well as state-society relations. He explained
that the key role social policy plays in terms of  economic
development, social cohesion and democratization has
been shown in UNRISD research on late-industrializing
Nordic, East Asian and Latin American countries). In
this research it also became clear that the financing
question had to be tackled successfully in order to build
sustainable development models. Finally, Mkandawire
said, he hoped that  the workshop would provide an
opportunity to share and learn from each other’s
experiences—across countries and across disciplines—




Report of  the UNRISD Workshop
24-25 April 2008, Geneva
2Social Policy
in Mineral-Rich Countries
Katja Hujo followed with an overview of  the research
project. She noted that in a context of globalization,
states’ capacities to raise revenues had been undermined
by processes like trade and capital account liberalization,
labour market problems like unemployment and
increasing informality, income and asset concentration,
and persistent debt problems. At the same time, there
was a growing need for social policies in order to
compensate for the social costs produced by market
volatility and economic crises, to provide income
support to increased numbers of unemployed and
excluded people, and to manage processes of
demographic and social change. At the time the
conference took place, the global economy was not yet
showing the dramatic signs of the economic and
financial crisis, as it was by late 2008, and the
international context still presented some positive
features such as low interest and inflation rates and
high commodity prices, which Hujo characterized as
windows of  opportunity for developing countries.
Describing the links between mineral wealth and social
development, she referred to the issue of human
resources; the enclave nature of the mining industry
and regional income and wage disparities; concerns about
fragmentation of national social systems through the
creation of privileged schemes for mining employees;
problems of  armed conflict financed by mineral rents;
the relationship between the mining industry and
migration; and effects of the sector and related policies
on gender and family structures. Hujo concluded by
outlining the main research questions guiding the project,
which focus on:
? the developmental and distributional impacts of
mineral rents and the ways mineral rents affect
production, reproduction, protection and re-
distribution;
? the link between resource abundance and key social
indicators in different countries;
? politics and political regimes that are engendered by
mineral wealth, and the implications for social
development and social policy;
? promising policies to tackle the macroeconomic
challenges associated with mineral wealth, as well as
preconditions to make these policies work; and
? policies that could create synergies between social and
economic policy, and the possibility of  trade-offs
between the two.
Following this introductory session, participants were
invited to make some initial comments on the broader
research framework. This discussion confirmed that
direct interaction between mineral-rich countries can
make an important contribution to “policy learning”
through knowledge sharing about successful develop-
ment experiences in these contexts.
Different actors like the World Bank, the Norwegian
government and international non-governmental
organizations (NGOs) are already active in this area.
Participants remarked upon the need not only to learn
from successful countries, but also to promote a
critical stance on one-size-fits-all policies and to move
beyond standardized solutions. Especially with regard
to newcomers like Mauritania or Ghana, which have
recently discovered natural resource wealth, it was
deemed useful to engage in ex ante analysis in order
to design institutions with the capacity to manage
revenues well. Furthermore, participants suggested
that the focus on the so-called resource curse, a
supposed negative relationship between natural
resource abundance and economic growth, had
resulted in deterministic views on the development
implications of mineral wealth and produced
confusion among developing countries—leading, for
example, to the paradoxical conclusion that a country
would do better to avoid finding oil and other natural
resources in order to grow. The real challenge for
mineral-rich countries, it was emphasized, is to
develop the capacity to absorb funds from the mineral
sector and allocate them to productive and social
investments. Unfortunately, this capacity and the
institutions that traditionally served to carry out such
functions were weakened, and even dismantled,
during the neoliberal adjustment era.
Session 1: Economic Challenges
and Potential in Mineral-Rich
Countries
The first thematic session of the workshop dealt with
economic challenges, growth performance and
economic policy responses in mineral-rich countries.
Although the challenges associated with mineral rents
are well known and common to all countries, economic
policy responses vary considerably. The range of
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mechanisms for coping with the threat of Dutch disease,1
as well as different approaches to manage and allocate
revenue streams from minerals, generate different
outcomes. The two papers presented in this session show
that both national and international factors influence
the economic performance of mineral-rich countries.
However, they place a stronger emphasis on the
significance of internal variables—institutions and
governance, investment in human capital and sound
macroeconomic policies.
Samuel Asfaha gave the first presentation of the session,
on “Economic Policy in Mineral-Rich Countries”.
According to Asfaha, resource-rich countries have to deal
with the issues of volatility and long-term sustainability
of prices and revenues. In addition, various problems
have been identified in mineral-rich countries: the already
mentioned resource-curse literature establishes a negative
correlation between mineral wealth and economic growth
as well as standards of living and democracy; many
analysts also see fertile ground for social conflict, poor
economic policy management (which explains a tendency
to fall into the Dutch disease trap), and heavy borrowing.
Additionally, some of  these countries are victims of
overconfidence with regard to the sustainability and
magnitude of flows, which leads to a “rent-seeking
mentality”, in the sense that the development of
productive activities is increasingly neglected. Policies end
up being influenced by politically connected interest
groups at the expense of entrepreneurialism, which
subsequently turns policy makers away from social
interests.
Asfaha argued that the effect of natural wealth on
development depends on how it is managed. To
illustrate this, he suggested two extreme scenarios. In
the first, the government spends all the proceeds of a
mineral boom on consumption, leading to real exchange
rate appreciation and Dutch disease symptoms, which
further fuel consumption, increase production of non-
traded goods and cause a real contraction in the non-
resource tradable sector. In the second, the government
invests the windfall proceeds of the boom in
productivity-augmenting projects, with which a country
can produce more of both traded and non-traded goods.
The second scenario is associated with growth and
increased productivity, which reflects an escape from
Dutch disease.
Asfaha explained that in the less successful empirical
cases, most expenditure was in the form of  over-
expanded public sector employment; wages and
transfers; and subsidies on food, fertilizers and
petroleum. Some ventures could even be characterized
as “white elephants” in which political prestige was the
sole driving force or in which funds were used to complete
obsolete projects or to prop up inefficient enterprises
with few or no linkages to the productive sectors of the
economy.
According to Asfaha, the prudent approach is to
accumulate savings during booms for sustainable
financing of  investment projects during busts. This
requires fiscal policy to be countercyclical in order to
avoid situations where revenue volatility is translated
into expenditure volatility. He cited the cases of  Mexico
and Nigeria to illustrate the effects of pro-cyclical
policies, where aggressive expenditure of  windfall oil
revenue was paralleled by a significant increase in
external debt. This stifled growth beyond what would
have resulted solely from a fall in commodity prices.
Asfaha then demonstrated that the resource curse can
be reversed with effective policy management. Countries
like Botswana, Indonesia and Norway accumulated huge
reserves and maintained macroeconomic stability. For
these countries, the return on assets invested represents
a significant source of revenue, more or less equal in
importance to customs and excise revenues. However,
Asfaha cautioned, when funds are readily available and
1 Dutch disease refers to rising inflation rates and exchange rate
appreciation produced by capital inflows. As a consequence, domestic
production becomes less competitive in world markets, adversely
affecting the country’s trade balance. In the longer term, investors tend
to shift their resources into the non-tradable sector.
The prudent approach is to
accumulate savings during booms
for sustainable financing of
investment projects during busts.
This requires fiscal policy to be
countercyclical in order to avoid





known to be available, exceptionally strong institutions
are required in order to maintain fiscal discipline.
Rent-seeking behaviour, incited by the considerable
returns to those who are able to capture mineral rents,
may lead to a concentration of economic and political
power in the hands of elites, and may breed corruption.
A reduction of efficiency and social equity as a result
of rent-seeking behaviour has been reported for oil-
rich countries like Mexico, Nigeria and Venezuela.
Policies tend to benefit groups that policy makers, or
their associates, are linked to. In these cases, policies
are guided by short time horizons that prioritize the
government’s short-term political gains, often at the
expense of  long-term economic development. This is
a problem that arises if elite interests are not linked
with the interests of production-based groups, as they
are in more successful cases such as Botswana.
Asfaha ended his presentation by pointing out some
recent international policy initiatives (such as the
international transparency initiative, or the World Bank’s
engagement in Chad) that aim at greater transparency
in the management of  mineral revenues. He expressed
doubts that these initiatives alone would be sufficient
to alter the political and economic incentives faced by
governments in mineral-rich countries.
The second thematic paper presented in this session
was “Development and Growth in Mineral-Rich
Countries”, by Thorvaldur Gylfason. He presented
empirical evidence based on newly published data sets
that shed light on the general hypothesis that natural
resource dependence may hurt economic growth in
developing countries, although resource abundance in
advanced countries seems to be beneficial. Gylfason
identified economic and political diversification,
investments in social and human capital, as well as
democracy and good institutions as important
factors to explain and enhance positive growth and
development performance.
According to Gylfason, social development and
economic growth are closely intertwined. When social
indicators of  life expectancy, fertility and literacy have
high levels, this conveys a clear and consistent picture
of progress, and sometimes a more accurate picture
than more commonly used economic indicators.
However, apart from education and health care, social
policy issues have been absent from much of the recent
academic debate on economic growth.
Gylfason then summarized debates surrounding the
relationship of economic growth and income
distribution. One well-established hypothesis is that
income inequality is a catalyst for real capital
accumulation and growth, given the large numbers of
rich people inclined to save. In this line of reasoning,
income redistribution would reduce savings, slow the
accumulation of capital, and thus reduce investment
and growth. Another hypothesis suggests that income
inequality endangers social cohesion, political stability
and peace, thus spoiling the investment claim; in this
view, it also triggers counterproductive demands for
redistribution, reducing efficiency and growth. Even
though the theoretical literature behind this is ambiguous
and inconclusive, Gylfason claims that there are strong
a priori and empirical grounds for believing that social
expenditure—and social policies more generally—do
matter for economic growth. Specifically, he said, saving
and investment, education, training, health care and
family planning, absence of corruption, democracy and
macroeconomic stability are important factors for
growth.
Gylfason went on to explain how natural
capital influences other kinds of capital or their
determinants. First, abundant natural resources may
blunt private and public incentives to save and invest,
slowing economic growth. Second, natural capital
may crowd out human capital by weakening private
and public incentives to give a high priority to
education. And third, mineral-rich countries tend to
be marred by rent seeking on the part of producers
who divert resources from more socially fruitful
economic activities; as mentioned in the previous
Newly published data sets shed
light on the general hypothesis that
natural resource dependence may
hurt economic growth in developing
countries, although resource
abundance in advanced countries
seems to be beneficial.
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presentation, this may lead to a concentration of
economic and political power.
Using recent data for 164 countries from the World
Bank, UNCTAD and Transparency International,
Gylfason then presented the results of various regression
models. His first finding was that school life expectancy2
is inversely related across countries to natural resource
dependence as represented by the share of natural
capital in total wealth. This would indicate that natural
capital tends to crowd out human capital. The second
finding was that corruption perception is positively
correlated across countries with the share of natural
capital in total wealth but inversely correlated with the
growth of  per capita GDP. Democracy was found to
be inversely correlated with the share of natural capital
in total wealth across countries, while growth was
positively correlated with democracy. These results
would support the conclusion that natural capital tends
to crowd out social capital and hurt growth. The third
finding was a close positive cross-country correlation
between school life expectancy and democracy, with
each additional year of schooling going along with an
increase in democracy by one point, supporting the
argument that human capital and social capital go hand
in hand. The fourth result highlighted by Gylfason was
that different aspects of social capital are likely to
interact and to reinforce each other, as indicated by the
inverse correlation between democracy and the
perception of corruption.
Gylfason went on to identify two ways in which natural
capital influences economic growth. On the one hand,
an increase in the share of natural capital in total wealth
reduces economic growth. On the other hand, an
increase in natural capital per person stimulates growth.
It should be noted that an increase in the natural capital
share tends to reduce growth in developing countries,
but may increase growth in industrialized countries.
In concluding his presentation, Gylfason summarized
the main arguments of  his paper. First, he said,
diversification is good for growth, as it allows a country
to move away from excessive reliance on natural
resources and from narrowly based political elites
towards full-fledged democracy. Second, social policy
and human capital (including social insurance, education
and health care) play a positive role in enhancing growth.
Third, Gylfason argued, a judicious use of natural
resources requires good institutions, which includes
democracy. Finally, he concluded, adequate strategies
to turn natural capital sustainably into human and social
capital are yet to be developed.
Discussion
The follow-up discussion was chaired by Janvier
Nkurunziza, with Katja Hujo and Albert Berry as
discussants. One of  the main issues addressed by Hujo
with regard to the Asfaha paper had to do with the
economic policy needed to combat Dutch disease.
She suggested discussing this question in the wider
context of the literature on developmental impacts
of capital inflows: one precondition to avoid
destabilizing effects of capital inflows is to have
relatively well-functioning institutions to conduct
fiscal, monetary or social policy to respond to these
flows. For example, reducing the supply of  domestic
currency through monetary sterilization is difficult
without a central bank managing a sufficiently large
monetary base. She then referred to the advantages
and disadvantages of devaluating the exchange rate
or of  exporting capital (for example through reserve
accumulation) in order to combat Dutch disease.
There are valid reasons why governments are
reluctant to devalue, as it is not easy to avoid
devaluation-debt/revaluation-inflation cycles,
potentially leading to bankruptcies in the productive
and financial sectors, dollarization and capital flight.
With regard to reserve accumulation or investment
of funds abroad, she held that these measures (which
aim at stabilization) could conflict with the need to
channel funds into social expenditure or other
investments. Those different objectives had to be
carefully balanced. And lastly, she noted how
uncomplicated it was to find fault with a policy after
it has been implemented. If we look at countries that
were praised for their economic model but then fell
into crisis, and others that were criticized for their
unorthodox approach but nevertheless performed
well, can we still claim that what the mainstream calls
“good policies” provide the sufficient conditions for
growth and development?
2 School life expectancy is the total number of years of schooling a child
can expect to receive, assuming that the probability of his or her being
enrolled in school at any particular future age is equal to the current
enrolment ratio at that age.
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Nkurunziza raised the need for a dynamic analysis. Nigeria,
he explained, had repaid most of its external debt because
of the recent oil boom, and it had also successfully
restructured its banking sector. It would be proper to
study such positive signs in contemporary Nigeria and
analyse what had prevented the country from showing
such signs earlier. He confirmed the opportunity costs
of  avoiding Dutch disease through reserve accumulation
and suggested that greater attention be paid to issues
such as capital flight, crowding-out of other revenues by
mineral rents and the external dimension of policy
making in mineral-rich countries as exemplified by the
World Bank–Chad cooperation.
Mkandawire commented that it was necessary to analyse
the forces that incite governments to use fiscal surpluses
in particular ways. The strength or weakness of  civil
society or trade unions, as well as other contextual
factors, are important to explain why some governments
spend and others do not. With regard to the discussion
on the concepts of rentier state versus rent-seeking, he
recalled that the term rentier state referred to the
revenue base of  a country, whereas rent-seeking
described the behaviour of capturing rents.
In his comments on the presentation by Gylfason, Berry
stated that the challenge of effective social policies in
mineral-rich countries was indeed a key challenge of
our times. Indeed, export booms invite spending on non-
tradables, but not necessarily on health and education.
While underlining the need to incorporate social policy
concerns early on into development strategies of
mineral-rich countries, he recognized the difficulties in
choosing the right timing and focus of such policies,
especially with regard to investments in human
resources, as uncertain and changing comparative
advantages and patterns of diversification in these
countries made planning a challenging task.
With regard to the argument that smaller family size
allows for higher per capita investments in education,
Berry mentioned the possibility of reverse causation,
where higher per capita income due to faster growth
slows population growth. In addition, he argued, the
strength of the argument regarding the relationship
between family size and investment in education needs
to be reconsidered both in light of the social return on
education and the willingness as well as capacity of the
state to invest in children from low-income families,
and the actual educational spending of small families. A
different transmission channel from mineral rents
toward low educational investments could be inequality,
as mineral rents are associated with income inequality
which in turn is correlated with less education. Finally,
Berry emphasized the importance of case studies in
order to approach the institutional question with regard
to legal, economic and social policy issues.
One participant acknowledged that even though
Gylfason’s presentation and related paper made the
innovative move toward linking questions of growth
performance in mineral-rich countries with social policy,
the analysis was situated within the framework of new
growth theories with their emphasis on investment in
human capital (health and education), and this is a
somewhat narrow approach to social policy and
development in general. Also, the focus on growth rates
sidelined the fact that most governments are actually
interested in “level” effects—that is, if mineral rents
allowed countries to make a jump in their income level,
then low to moderate growth rates would not be
considered a problem. This raised the related question
of how mineral-rich countries could embark on more
fundamental structural transformations that would
diminish the reliance of future generations on mineral
revenues. Botswana was mentioned as an example where
macroeconomic stability went hand in hand with low
structural transformation and poor social development.
In this context, another participant added that the
crucial questions revolved around maximizing rents and
appropriating rents. The second aspect leads to issues
of taxation of rent, which actually minimizes distortions
in the economy and provides revenue for social
investment.
Given the presentation’s emphasis on increasing human
capital, and education in particular, the higher rate of
return on investment for poor people was acknowledged
to make sense from a microeconomic point of  view.
However, in a macro context the positive growth effect
would depend on employment opportunities and the
characteristics of  labour markets.
Some participants also expressed doubts about the
research finding that democracy increases efficiency
and growth. It was argued that there is no such thing as
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a natural development path based on a political system.
Voting power is not enough to determine standards of
living.
The discussants and other part ic ipants also
commented on the econometrics and correlations
used, their validity and the fact that they do not
represent causation. The fact that social relations are
usually left out of such an analysis was deemed
problematic. There was also a proposal to use
dynamic growth models to look at changes over time,
in order to verify whether experiences had been
different in other periods.
Session 2: State Capacity and
Social Policies in Mineral-Rich
Countries
Can revenue from mineral extraction constitute a
sustainable source of finance for social policies? What
are the linkages between mineral wealth, social policy
and human welfare? What are the roles of domestic
institutions and state capacity in mineral-rich countries?
These are some of the questions explored in the papers
presented during this session. Both presentations
emphasized tax systems as a key element linking mineral
production and social expenditure. They also emphasized
the importance of firmly establishing social priorities in
political agendas and of forming strategic alliances to
support these.
Evelyn Dietsche’s presentation on “Institutional Change
and Developmental State Capacity in Mineral-Rich
Countries” had two objectives: first, to critically assess
the role of institutions and the domestic conditions for
institutional change in mineral-rich countries; and second,
to explore in more detail how resource extraction is
taxed, and what impact fiscal regimes and the concepts
that have guided their design may have on the prospects
for building state capacity. Given that not all mineral-
rich countries have failed to promote development, she
challenged the hypothesis that negative performance is
inevitable. At the same time, however, there is no
consensus in the literature on the factors that have
driven economic and social development in these
countries.
In her presentation, Dietsche noted that while the quality
of institutions matters, it is important to identify the
conditions under which institutions change. If countries
are able to improve the quality of their institutions, this
contradicts the supposed inevitable negative outcome
produced by resource exploitation (that is, the resource
curse). She bemoaned the lack of discussion on how
institutions actually change and the requirements for
bringing about such change. She argued that a negative
institutional legacy can only be overcome if there is scope
for policy actors to introduce a process of positive
institutional change despite prevailing structural conditions.
However, there is neither theoretical nor empirical clarity
about the conditions that favour such action.
Dietsche also noted the measurement problems
regarding what constitutes a “good institution”. How
should institutions and their quality be assessed? Often,
what is viewed as constituting a good institution is based
on subjective assessments by particular interest groups,
and not on objectively acquired knowledge. According
to Dietsche, successful countries are characterized by
the ability of policy makers to build a state apparatus
that provides an effective infrastructure for advancing
economic and social development.
She then went on to discuss the conditions for
institutional change, particularly in relation to revenue
policies and political bargaining over resources. In the
context of  distributive struggle, convergent economic
interests of two or more relevant social interests groups
can tip the political balance toward positive institutional
change. It is less clear when and how such convergences
evolve, and who the winners and the losers are.
Inefficient outcomes can also arise in such struggles, if
potential losers block change, or potential winners cannot
credibly commit to compensating powerful losers.
Both presentations emphasized tax
systems as a key element linking
mineral production and social
expenditure. They also emphasized
the importance of  firmly
establishing social priorities in
political agendas and of  forming
strategic alliances to support these.
8Social Policy
in Mineral-Rich Countries
Dietsche next discussed the role of taxation in
state capacity building. Resource extraction allows
governments to generate revenue with relatively little
public administrative capacity and without taxpayer
representation in fiscal decisions. In turn, broad-based
taxation benefits the quality of institutions and
governance because the imperative to raise revenue on
mobile assets provides a positive stimulus for state
capacity building. This is due to the fact that mobile
resources (income, capital and, to a lesser degree, labour)
have the option to exit, if there is no minimum
consensus on the tax policy. The relative bargaining
power of different interest groups is important to
understanding how to build state capacity and to change
existing institutions toward better management of assets
and revenues.
Might the design of fiscal regimes contribute to
undermining state capacity building and institutional
change in the long run? Regarding fiscal regimes as they
apply to mineral taxes, Dietsche summarized two types:
royalty/tax systems and contractual systems. Royalty/
tax systems allow companies to take full control of
production processes, and in return they pay taxes and
royalties. The fiscal terms are usually set unilaterally by
the government or negotiated with private investors.
These systems are more typically found in developed
countries where legislation spells out the tax policy for
the sector. Contractual systems include production-
sharing contracts and service agreements. These are
found more often in developing countries. Fiscal terms,
which are often kept confidential, are typically negotiated
between the executive and foreign investors.
According to Dietsche, theory suggests that taxation
of the mineral sector should focus on taxing the
resource rent, which should be shared fairly between
the government and the extracting company. A country
interested in long-term viability would leave a sufficient
share of the pure rent to companies in order to retain
investors’ interest in the development of the resource
sector. Taxing the resource rent involves moving away
from taxing production and toward taxing profits.
But this poses a problem for countries with low
administrative capacity, since administrative processes
and enforcement of profit-based taxation tends to be
more difficult and requires that governments wait longer
to receive their fair share of the resource rent.
Dietsche noted that the political economy of taxation
predicts that greater resource revenues undermine state
capacity building and truncate institutional change.
This proposit ion raises the quest ion of the
conditions under which mineral-rich countries might
nevertheless be able to pursue positive institutional
changes. She suggested three possible scenarios: (i)
if immobile asset holders can align themselves with
domestic constituents with whom they share a
common interest with regard to the management of
assets and revenues, so as to achieve positive
development outcomes; (ii) if other domestic social
and political conditions (such as effective veto powers
by political constituencies) push political elites to seek
legitimacy and build state capacity, despite the
independence from broad-based revenue collection
granted by mineral revenues; (iii) if the taxation of
the mineral  sector produces some form of
administrative capacity which also serves the
efficiency of  resource revenue spending.
One of  Dietsche’s main conclusions was that the key
challenge for mineral-rich countries is not a purely
financial one; to aim at more revenues—as a number
of countries have done until recently—is not
sufficient. The main challenges were political and
social, she argued, in the sense that those who could
influence policy making need to gain an interest in
the pursuit of social policies that are effective for
development.
Following Dietsche’s presentation, the thematic paper
titled “Social Policy and State Revenues in Mineral-Rich
Countries” was presented by its lead author, Leonith
Hinojosa-Valencia. She began by outlining the context
in which mineral exploitation was expanding: growth
of the world economy since the 1990s, which had
increased demand for mineral resources, and the shift
of activities and expenditures in the mineral sector from
the industrialized to the developing countries. As a result,
said Hinojosa, there was a growing recognition that the
inflow of wealth generated by natural resource
exploitation might create opportunities for mineral-rich
developing countries to implement social policy in order
to increase their citizen’s social welfare. Hinojosa’s
presentation examined the extent to which state revenue
and mineral export dependence are connected, and their
likely effect on social expenditure.
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Hinojosa expressed two concerns regarding the
relationship between transformative social policies and
mineral development: (i) whether revenue from mineral
extraction can constitute a sustainable way to finance
social policies; and (ii) whether the exploitation of
mineral resources undermines the productive
development of the economy as well as the political
balance needed to maximize welfare and growth.
Hinojosa noted that many of the pessimistic conclusions
found in the literature about the mineral sectors and
overall social welfare are drawn from cross-country
studies that rely on comparisons between mineral and
non-mineral economies, and sometimes even between
developed and less-developed countries. These studies
introduce, but do not address explicitly, a number of
factors (other than mineral wealth) that can explain the
disparate outcomes in terms of  economic performance
and welfare. To overcome such shortcomings, Hinojosa
and her coauthors focused their analysis exclusively on
mineral-dependent countries in order to expose
relationships between mineral wealth, state revenues and
public expenditure in social services. The inquiry was
founded on three main assumptions.
First, she remarked, in mineral-dependent countries the
level of state revenue that is derived from the mineral
sector and can be used for social policy purposes is not
associated with the degree of mineral export
dependence. Mineral-rich countries do obtain fiscal
benefits from mineral exploitation, especially in the long
term, based on their taxation method. The question is
whether these methods are adequate to bring sufficient
revenue. The fear that taxation will repel investors and
the fact that there is no ideal tax system should also be
taken into consideration. According to the results of
the regression models, Hinojosa said, there is no
particular relationship between a competitive economy,
capable of attracting more investment based on lower
taxation, and the welfare outcomes it may be able to
generate through state revenue. For instance, while
Sweden and Chile have been able to develop a welfare
state regime with a strategy of  lower tax rates, other
mineral-dependent countries could have achieved the
same despite—or perhaps because of—high taxes
imposed on mining investments.
Second, Hinojosa argued, in mineral-dependent
economies the linkage between mineral wealth and social
policy occurs through four dimensions. Thus, mineral
wealth has the potential to encourage higher levels of
social expenditure, to create fiscal space for social policy,
to influence the composition of social expenditure and
to enable social policy initiatives to get started. According
to the correlation and cluster analyses conducted by
Hinojosa and her colleagues, the association between
revenue and expenditure in social sectors was found in
each instance to be positive and significant; similar results
were reported for tax revenue. However, there were
mixed results in the correlations between taxes on
income, profits and capital gains, and expenditure in
social sectors: negative in the case of health care but
positive in the case of  education. This suggests that the
higher the mineral dependence, the lower the revenue
that is captured by governments and, hence, the lower
the amounts allocated for expenditure in social sectors.
The evidence was less conclusive in regard to the
allocation of mineral tax revenues among sectors, even
though it seemed to favour the education sector.
According to Hinojosa, these results could be accounted
for by looking at the nature of the government
(authoritarian or democratic) and the role of civil
society in protecting social spending, particularly in
education. In that sense, and taking into account the
hypothesis that governments in mineral-dependent
countries would use additional mineral budgetary
resources in those sectors (and places) where more
political pressure is observed, Hinojosa suggested that
the final effect of mineral resources on the composition
of social expenditure could depend upon the balance
between social forces.
In terms of  the effects of  mineral wealth on the
composition of social expenditure as a way of assessing
what consequences, if  any, mineral wealth produces on
the welfare mix, Hinojosa showed that mineral wealth
Mineral wealth has the potential to
encourage higher levels of social
expenditure, to create fiscal space
for social policy, to influence the
composition of social expenditure
and to enable social policy




does not seem to significantly affect the welfare mix
compared to what would be observed otherwise
without it; on the contrary, mineral wealth appears to
reinforce it.
As a final reflection on the second assumption, Hinojosa
explored the ways in which mineral wealth may
influence the trajectory of  new social policy initiatives.
In a context of extractive industries expansion,
organized reaction of civil society groups, as well as of
companies, would seem to reinforce the role that
ideologies play in defining a particular welfare mix, as
well as its financial basis. Indeed, she recalled, recent
studies on the Andean countries have suggested that
civil society organizations have shaped the social
responsibilities adopted by corporations in the mining
sector and influenced the positions assumed by
governments regarding the relationships (and trade-offs)
between mineral investment and people’s rights.
Hinojosa then introduced the third and final assumption
which states that in mineral-rich developing countries,
the capture of mineral revenue by the state and its
correlated expenditure in social policy depends on the
quality of government.
Hinojosa reported the results from the quantitative
analysis, which suggests that in many mineral-dependent
developing countries the institutional apparatus is only
partly prepared to take advantage of  mineral resources.
Thus, Hinojosa and her coauthors suggested, the
formulation and implementation of  social policy could
produce not just improvements of social welfare
conditions, but also a transformation of  the state itself,
by enhancing the functioning of government
and opening up spaces for mechanisms of good
governance. However, she called for caution regarding
the channels through which social policy could play such
a transformative role in contexts of mineral expansion.
While in some mineral-dependent countries the quality
of government might be enhanced through policy and
institutional change (including formal and informal
institutions), deeper structural change in the state
apparatus may be needed in others. This, she remarked,
requires further understanding of the ways in which
mineral development produces incentives, alliances and
conflicts that influence the trajectories of state formation,
and, hence, greater attention to its impact on governance.
In the final part of her presentation, Hinojosa sketched
out the main components of a framework to address
the linkages between state revenues and social policy
in contexts of mineral wealth. There is not enough
evidence to support any simplistic argument about the
relations between mineral dependence, social policy and
human welfare. Therefore, one point of departure is
that fiscal space opened up by the revenue capture
from mineral sectors can be used for a number of
social policy purposes that can range from extending
existing policies to complementing what already exists.
Should the purpose of public policy be to achieve some
acceptable level of  social welfare, it was suggested that
mineral wealth is a second order conditioning factor which,
wherever it occurs, could be used in a way that best
responds to established social priorities, determined by
first order conditioning factors such as political consensus
and an agreed development strategy.
Such a framework to address social policies in contexts
of mineral wealth would include the findings presented
thus far but also the first order conditioning factors.
The framework, Hinojosa argued, could be useful for
understanding and assessing the influences of mineral
wealth on the configuration of a social welfare mix
and, hence, for social policy design. Thus, it would help
to identify areas where social policy could foster,
strengthen or correct paths of social welfare.
Hinojosa concluded her presentation by referring to
possible future research on the topic. This could include
country and comparative case studies on the effects
of mineral expansion on welfare regimes, and inquiries
into the effects of mineral expansion on the emergence
and development of domestic markets (particularly
The formulation and
implementation of social policy
could produce not just
improvements of social welfare
conditions, but also a
transformation of  the state itself,
by enhancing the functioning of
government and opening up
spaces for mechanisms




labour and financial markets). Research on the structural
and institutional conditions under which the connection
between mineral expansion and social policy can lead to
development was also suggested.
Discussion
In the follow-up discussion, chaired by Yusuf  Bangura,
discussant Halvor Mehlum began by pointing out the
complexity of  institutions and their policies. He argued
that institutions are necessary in order to provide
incentives that are producer friendly and not “grabber
friendly”. With regard to good or bad institutions, he
held that it is not a matter of good or bad intentions,
but rather whether institutions can withstand (or not)
the pressures they will inevitably face. For example,
inflation targeting pursued by the central bank in
Norway helped to discipline fiscal policy, especially as
important voter groups had mortgages with flexible
interest rates. These voters therefore had an interest in
maintaining price stability at low interest rates and
monitored the government on this.
Anthony Hall was the second discussant. His first
remark related to the final conclusion that despite the
observed inability to draw clear relations between
mineral dependence, social policy and human welfare,
there was a potential link between revenue generation
as a second-order condition for social development. In
this context he emphasized the importance of
understanding the political economy, history and social
policy drivers of a country as a starting point. Case
studies like that of Ecuador tell an important story
about the role of governments, corporations, external
actors and other groups, such as indigenous people,
with regard to social policy programmes
and revenue allocation. Although in his view
generalizations have to be handled with care, suggestions
as to how countries can reinforce redistribution would
be helpful. This type of analysis would move beyond
looking at social policy instruments in technocratic
terms that are focused mainly on efficiency aspects.
The discussion then moved toward debating how specific
countries deal with the issues brought up by the presenters
and discussants, and how they use revenue from mineral
resources. Chile moved from the nationalized system of
the early 1970s to a mixed system in the 1980s. Between
1990 and 2005, transnational mining companies in the
copper sector accounted for 70 per cent of national
production, but then the notion of rent re-entered policy
debates and the state reconsidered how to capture this
rent for development purposes. In Zambia, the former
state-owned copper industry was privatized with the result
that the country received little revenue from the huge
profits made in this sector. One participant mentioned
that it was puzzling that, when talking about corporations,
people refer to profits but when they talk about states,
they refer to rents.
Whereas the necessity to bargain about revenue shares
and to renegotiate contracts between countries and
companies was mentioned by several participants, the
argument that mineral revenues had to be protected from
“political interference” was also discussed. In this sense, it
was argued, it is reasonable to put in place mechanisms
that tie the hand of government entities that receive money
from natural resources. One participant said that since
natural resources offer a source of “easy money” to
governments, international institutions such as the World
Bank and the International Monetary Fund were right in
emphasizing conditionality in loans. Here it was added
that conditionality could be useful if it allowed governments
to pursue “good” policies and externalize the responsibility
for them vis-à-vis their electoral constituencies.
This perspective was contested by another participant,
who argued that the IFIs’ conditionalities had induced
massive policy failures and taken a huge toll in terms
of  people’s lives and countries’ development
performance. Finally, the fundamental problem
between democracy and technocracy was mentioned.
If democracy really matters, everything that could
undermine it should be questioned. The topic was
wrapped up with the argument that technocrats can be
a good complement to pressure groups if they focus
on issues that would otherwise be neglected.
Session 3: Mineral Rents and
Social Policy in Norway and
Chile
Norway and Chile stand out as successful cases within
the group of  mineral-rich countries. In both, mineral
rents represent a significant proportion of exports and




in Chile than in Norway. As mentioned earlier, mineral-
rich countries share a common set of macroeconomic
pressures and challenges. However, compared with other
mineral-rich countries, Norway and Chile have achieved
very different human development outcomes. Both rank
high in terms of human development, which is usually
attributed to a combination of sound economic policies,
strong institutions and a commitment to development
and poverty reduction.
Halvor Mehlum was the first speaker of this session,
presenting his coauthored paper on “Mineral Rents and
Social Development in Norway”. The study highlighted
the dimensions along which Norway differs from
resource-abundant countries with less favourable
development performance. Even though Norway was
a poor country just a century ago, it now offers a broad
welfare programme and is the world leader in per capita
income. According to Mehlum this is due to a
combination of economic opportunities and political
decisions. His main argument was that for countries
with high-quality institutions—and in particular those
that manage to secure strong protection of property
rights and low corruption—natural resources contribute
positively to development, as they provide investors
with new investment opportunities and create positive
externalities for other agents. Without functioning
institutions, however, natural resources might stimulate
predation, rent-seeking and other harmful activities with
negative externalities for the rest of  the economy.
Mehlum said that different types of natural resources
are likely to have a different impact on growth—the
impact of oil and minerals may be different from forests
or agricultural goods, for example. He noted that
regression analyses usually include all types of resources
without distinction. Instead, he suggested conducting
more differentiated research on this issue in order to
gain more substantive insights into the economic and
political implications of different natural resources. A
particularly striking element, in his view, was the fact that
a “challenging resource” like oil had not been problematic
for Norway. He posited that for Norway there was no
resource curse, first, because of the existence of good
institutions and the provision of incentives for the
productive use of oil wealth, and second, because the
technical expertise developed for offshore oil extraction
had positive spillover effects for the rest of  the economy.
For Mehlum and his coauthors, this positive
performance in Norway is explained by strong
democratic governance based on broad political
representation with checks and balances in civil society.
A functioning state bureaucracy was already in place
when oil was discovered, as well as a developed
industrial sector with strong trade unions
and employers’ associations. He also argued that
parliamentary systems such as Norway’s—as opposed
to presidential rule—tend to favour redistributive public
spending on universal programmes that benefit all
citizens. Spending oil revenue on social services and
social security had another advantage in terms of  equity,
he explained. Tax cuts or gasoline subsidies, both of
which are common in oil countries, usually favour higher
income groups, whereas social expenditure on health
and education stimulated growth by fostering the
accumulation of human capital.
Another distinctive feature of the Norwegian model is
the tradition of consensus building over policy choices
that have long-term implications for the nation. There
is a remarkable continuity in the management of the
oil sector, and policy makers, regardless of ideological
orientation, have managed to stabilize revenue volatility
through countercyclical policies. High savings rates have
been equally important to escape the resource curse,
although the regression analysis supporting this claim
does not explain the underlying causality.
Finally, the creation of  the Norwegian Petroleum Fund
in 1990 and the establishment of strict rules regarding
the use of  the fund’s surplus helped to foster inter-
generational equity (the fund is meant to finance future
pensions) and to avoid expansionary fiscal policies that
could endanger macroeconomic stability in the country.
The case study on “Mineral Rents and Social
Development in Chile” was presented by Juan Carlos
For Norway there was no resource
curse because of the existence of
good institutions and the provision





Guajardo. He explained how Chilean history was closely
tied to minerals. In his view, the general impact of  mining
has been positive for the development performance of
the country. Fortunately, important lessons on excessive
dependence on mineral resources, especially with regard
to state revenues, were learned during the early periods
of mineral production and shaped subsequent policy
approaches. During the nitrate cycle between 1880 and
1931, tax income generated by nitrate production
represented 42 per cent of total government earnings,
but between 1932 and 1945 this fell to only 14 per cent.
The production of synthetic nitrates at a lower price and
the world crisis of 1929 marked the end of this mineral
boom. From then on, fear of product substitution
processes and price fluctuations led to demands for
higher national participation in the management of the
country’s natural resources. It was increasingly
emphasized that there was a need to diversify the
economy in order to avoid mining enclaves and excessive
fluctuations of public revenues.
At the beginning in the twentieth century, copper came
to dominate the Chilean economy. The industry was
developed with substantive investment from the United
States, which generated debates about the implications
of foreign control of the sector. In 1955, the Chilean
government gained more control over the copper
industry, which was finally nationalized in 1971 on
the basis of  a constitutional reform with broad
parliamentary approval. Some privatization of mining
properties was promoted between 1973 and 1990 during
the rule of  Augusto Pinochet, while CODELCO, the
national copper enterprise, remained a state-owned
company. However, only the return to democratic rule
in 1990 generated the necessary political stability to
attract significant foreign investment: private mining
has grown, on average, 16 per cent annually since 1990
and represented 69 per cent of total national copper
production in 2007.
More recently, Guajardo noted, the debate over the
contribution of private mining to development became
a top national issue and led, in turn, to a new law in
2005 that established a specific tax on mining activity
(Royalty 2). This was deemed necessary for two main
reasons: first, to strengthen innovation and productive
development in an economy that relied strongly on non-
renewable resources; and second, to generate the
necessary financial means to respond to the high
expectations regarding economic and social policy that
democratic leaders in Chile were confronted with.
Indeed, as Guajardo went on to explain, although there
was no direct relationship between mining revenues and
social spending, as taxes were not earmarked for specific
expenditure purposes, mining generated more public
revenues than any other sector in the economy,
representing 35 percent of total revenues in 2006. This
allowed the democratic governments after 1990 to
increase social spending and to tackle the ‘social debt’
that had accumulated during the years of  dictatorship,
when expenditure on social policy had been sharply
reduced. Social policies in Chile followed the principles
of decentralization, private sector participation and
targeting of  benefits toward the most vulnerable groups.
In combination with what is usually described as prudent
fiscal and macroeconomic policies, Chile succeeded in
creating high growth with low inflation rates, reduction
of public debt, falling unemployment rates, increases
in real salaries, reduction of poverty rates and last but
not least, a diversification of the economy based on
natural resources (mainly agricultural) other than mining.
As such, Guajardo said, there seem to be no signs of a
resource curse in Chile.
One of the major institutional improvements achieved
by Chile based on historical lessons is the fiscal policy
built on the concept of a central government structural
balance, in effect since 2001. The structural balance
reflects the medium-term fiscal outlook and involves
estimating the fiscal income that would be obtained net
of the impact of the economic cycle (the level of
economic activity and the prices of copper and
In Chile, mining generated more
public revenues than any other
sector in the economy, representing
35 percent of total revenues in 2006.
This allowed the democratic
governments after 1990 to increase
social spending and to tackle the
‘social debt’ that had accumulated




molybdenum, a by-product of copper production), and
spending only the amount that would be compatible
with this level of income. In practice, this means saving
during economic booms, when revenues known to be
of only a temporary nature are received, and spending
the revenues in situations when fiscal income drops.
Among the benefits Chile has gained in applying the
structural balance concept are the implementation of a
countercyclical policy; the increase in public savings
during periods of strong growth which has, in
turn, helped to prevent currency appreciation and
safeguarded the competitiveness of the export sector;
the reduction of interest rate volatility; a higher credibility
of the Chilean government as an issuer of international
debt, which has led to a reduction in the sovereign risk
premium it has to pay; improved access to foreign
financing during negative external shocks and less
contagion from international crises; the reduction of
foreign financing requirements; and the facilitation of
long-term planning of  social policies as financial
sustainability is ensured.
By way of  conclusion, Guajardo pointed out that Chile’s
institutional strength and the strong political consensus
regarding the lessons learned from the country’s history
are the key factors contributing to its successful
development performance. In his view, the remaining
challenges include the sectoral and regional disparities
in productivity (mostly between mining and non-mining
activities) which aggravate income disparities and
exacerbate existing inequalities in the country, as well as
the challenge of further increasing the diversification
and competitiveness of  the Chilean economy.
Discussion
This session’s discussion was chaired by Shahra Razavi,
with Thorvaldur Gylfason and Manuel Riesco as
discussants. Gylfason started his comments on the
presentation by Mehlum by acknowledging that Norway
had indeed been one of the poorest countries in Europe
and that natural resources had helped project the country
to the top of  the Human Development Index ranking.
However, he noted, this development was not unique
to Norway: its neighbours, Denmark, Finland, Iceland
and Sweden, also moved from the bottom of the heap
in Europe around 1900 to close to the top in 2000,
despite benefiting to varying degrees from natural
resource wealth. He posited that human capital
accumulation was the primary force behind Norway’s
economic transformation.
According to Gylfason, Norway presents some
symptoms of Dutch disease, such as the stagnant ratio
of  exports of  goods and services to GDP since oil
became the main export commodity, the absence of
high-tech companies, and (perhaps) government
reticence to undertake reforms in the public sector (in
health and education in particular). Gylfason agreed
with the authors’ assessment of the reasons for the
success of the Norwegian oil sector, noting that the
most important factors were the definition of oil and
gas as common property, the government’s absorption
of approximately 80 percent of the resource rent over
time, the wisdom of writing “preventive legislation” and
ethical principles in the beginning to guide the use of
the resources in the future, the consensus among major
political parties to shield the economy from an excessive
influx of  oil money, and the transfer of  the management
of the oil fund from the finance ministry to the newly
independent central bank. Gylfason concluded his
comments with the question of why Norway had not
been able to be equally successful in the management
of  its fishery industry.
In his comments, the second discussant, Manuel Riesco,
argued that from a developmental perspective, there
was a darker side to Chile’s spectacular mining boom
Guajardo had emphasized in his presentation. Among
the negative aspects, Riesco cited the privatization of
most of the rent related to mineral extraction due to
ill-conceived tax policies, the appropriation of mineral
rents by foreign companies, and distortions in resource
allocation as a result of incentives provided to mineral
investments, which harm the economy and state revenue
in particular. In support of  his arguments, he provided
a detailed analysis of the participation of private mining
companies in the sector, and their performance in terms
of company profits and contributions toward tax
revenues. His calculations were based on a comparison
between the state-owned company CODELCO and the
only private company for which financial balance sheets
were publicly available, Escondida. Whereas the state
holding CODELCO produced 90 per cent of copper
until 1989, private companies now account for 70 per




Riesco explained that public opinion in Chile had
consistently and overwhelmingly opposed suggestions
to privatize CODELCO and, to the contrary, favoured
higher tax contributions from private mining companies.
A first move in the right direction had been achieved
through the implementation of the special tax on mining,
which had already produced over $1 billion3 in addition
to regular income taxes paid by the private mining sector.
However, according to Riesco, these amounts were still
far from adequate if account is taken of the huge profits
earned by private mining companies between 2005 and
2007. If the private companies paid the same proportion
of  taxes as CODELCO, relative to their respective
shares in copper production, this would allow the Chilean
state to raise social expenditures by more than two-
thirds. Riesco therefore advocated strongly for retaining
and maximizing Chilean mineral rents for the social
development of  the country.
In the plenary discussion that followed, one participant
asked how the Norwegian response to Dutch disease—
creating a highly competitive oil sector with technological
spillovers to other sectors, and solving the employment
problem through expansion of  the social service
sector—was replicable in developing countries. Another
participant wondered how institutional capacity in
Norway could be explained historically; in particular,
why had Norway placed such great emphasis on state
management of the oil sector, and continued to do so
over time, despite the increasing popularity of market-
led approaches. Norway’s position outside the European
Union was also mentioned; had this sovereignty played
a role in the country’s success?
A number of questions were raised on the Chilean case
study. Had specific policies prompted the diversification
of the economy? With regard to the successful
management of Dutch disease, several additional tools
like capital controls, the crawling peg exchange rate
(periodic devaluations) and capital exports by pension
funds were mentioned. Another participant asked for
further details on one negative aspect of the Chilean
model, income inequality, and another inquired about
the relationship between mining and the political regime
in Chile. Finally, the importance of  geopolitics in
determining governments’ room for manoeuvre in the
management of natural resources was mentioned.
According to one participant, domestic policy space
seems to have increased since the end of  the Cold War.
In his response to the discussant and the plenary,
Mehlum explained that oil revenue had indeed been an
important contribution to national income in Norway,
but it had also resulted in a rise in the cost of living in
the country. However, he argued that certain changes
in relative prices and corresponding structural shifts
come naturally with foreign exchange funding and do
not represent symptoms of Dutch disease. One
challenge was to prepare for future times when oil
production and revenues would surely decrease (in this
context, he was worried by the dramatic decline in the
number of students choosing the sciences in school
and university).
With regard to Norway’s position outside the European
Union, Mehlum suggested that due to the different nature
of business cycles in Norway as compared to most
European countries it would be difficult to join a common
currency. An additional reason to remain outside the EU
was the political weight of farmers, who receive important
subsidies funded by oil revenues. As to the government
role in the oil sector, Mehlum said that strategic issues
probably played a role. Norway was a reliable ally of the
United States during the Cold War. When the Norwegian
government gradually expanded its role vis-à-vis the private
multinationals that were participating in oil exploration,
this was not criticized by the United States despite the
complaints of  the oil multinationals. Finally, Mehlum
affirmed the importance of the social policy dimension
of  the Norwegian model in which social services and social
policy are extensive, with positive effects on the
participation of women in the labour market.
With regard to the discussion on the Chilean experience,
Guajardo argued that the diversification in the economy
could be explained, at least in part, by the policy change
in the late 1970s toward export-orientation and world
markets. Macroeconomic stability was maintained
throughout the democratic transition in order to
strengthen the credibility of the new regime, the
importance of which was one of the key lessons learned
during previous periods of  instability. On the question
of income distribution, Guajardo explained that the




entrenched since colonial times when assets were
concentrated among a small number of elites. The
situation had deteriorated during the Pinochet regime,
as redistributive measures were missing and social
protection was insufficient. To increase social mobility
in the future, he posited, education could play an
important role.
With regard to the contribution of mining and mining
companies to national development, he emphasized
that frameworks should be adjusted in a flexible
manner to changing political and economic conditions.
The fact that commodity markets experienced huge
profit increases was not an isolated phenomenon in
the world. One problem was that mining companies
did not have price agreements with countries that
would allow governments to capture more revenue
when prices increase. In his concluding remarks,
Guajardo reminded participants of the fact that
before rents can be captured, they have to be created,
which was a risky business as only 1 per cent
of investments actually end up in commercial
production. He therefore called for a balanced
approach, between avoiding rent seeking and laying
the ground for a competitive mining industry.
Session 4: Overview Country
Studies: Indonesia and Nigeria
This session focused on two additional country case
studies, Indonesia and Nigeria, again highlighting the
numerous challenges of and approaches to managing
mineral rents in the developing world. Whereas
conventional wisdom usually declares Indonesia a success
story and Nigeria an example of failure, the presenters’
more nuanced analysis drew out lessons from each case.
In particular, they explained, countries perform differently
in different time periods. In both Indonesia and Nigeria,
politics and political change played an important role but,
as pointed out in the discussion of  Chile and Norway, the
institutional and macroeconomic contexts are equally
influential in the management of minerals and ultimately
affect development outcomes.
William Ascher began his presentation on “Mineral
Wealth, Development and Social Policy in Indonesia”
by outlining the main research questions he had pursued
in his paper. In seeking to establish a clear link between
mineral exploitation and social services, he sought to
identify where the flow of resource revenues may be
drained away from social services. On the other hand,
he drew attention to the fact that Indonesia had quite
successfully managed the transition from a low-income
economy that was highly dependent on minerals to a
lower middle income country and being a net oil
importer. This transition bears important lessons for
other oil-exporting countries that are likely to face a
similar evolution in the future.
According to Ascher, the main objective of social policy
is to maximize the use of  social services through ample
public and private supply of  high-quality services that
are affordable to the poor, and through the provision
of  incentives to encourage service usage. Mineral rents
could shape the use of  social services through many
channels. Direct channels may include the use of  mineral
revenues to finance central or subnational government
programmes and transfers, while indirect channels refer
to the effects of mineral rents on overall economic
growth and income distribution. The latter determines
household income and the ability of households to
contribute to social insurance or to purchase social
services through the market.
Ascher then went on to situate Indonesia as a past and
present producer of hydrocarbons and hard minerals,
pointing out that the country had never been wealthy
in subsoil assets in per capita terms compared to other
nations. However, particularly in the past, Indonesia
was a significant oil exporter and also had a significant
budgetary dependence on oil revenues. Similar to
countries like Mexico or Nigeria, declining domestic
production levels intersected with rising domestic
consumption, turning Indonesia more recently into a
net oil importer.
Ascher further explained that Indonesia, Mexico and
Nigeria, besides being populous developing nations, also
share similar policy histories and outcomes: (i) large,
vertically integrated state oil and gas companies with
retail monopolies; (ii) requirements for international
companies to enter into partnerships with state
companies; (iii) serious problems of inefficiency and
corruption; (iv) disincentives for foreign investment due




instability; (v) efforts to privatize state oil and gas
companies; and (vi) periods of drastically low domestic
fuel prices, countered by efforts to readjust prices to a
more sustainable level.
What stands out in the case of Indonesia is that generally
sound economic management has kept the country on
a path that has maintained agricultural production and
simultaneously expanded a competitive manufacturing
sector, thereby decreasing dependence on raw material
exports. In this sense, Ascher claimed, the resource curse
could be avoided. Despite its massive natural resource
wealth, the country’s economy grew strongly during the
1970s and 1980s. At that time, Indonesia was dependent
on oil and gas exports, which in 1980 represented 70 per
cent of  government revenue. Yet, the rise in
manufacturing and a strong domestic tax effort have
since reduced the dependence on oil and gas revenues
to the range of 20 to 25 per cent of fiscal receipts, and
the net contribution of foreign exchange from oil and
gas is minimal.
A significant proportion of the revenue from oil and
gas captured during the post-1975 boom was channeled
into agriculture, infrastructure and social services.
During the oil boom of the 1970s, 20 per cent of
government investment expenditure went into
agriculture, compared with 2 per cent in Nigeria.
Indonesia also avoided Dutch disease by devaluing the
currency when oil prices were particularly high,
protecting domestic production from cheap imports and
maintaining the export potential of the national
economy. The Indonesian government also contained
inflation and consumption by investing a significant
proportion of the windfall revenues abroad. The
impressive domestic savings rate of 30 per cent attained
by the country by 1980 has been maintained.
Ascher also observed that governance, though still
marked by authoritarian practices, has improved in
terms of  institutional capacity. Even though the
institutions related to oil exploitation have traditionally
been weak, according to Ascher, the country has long
benefited from strong institutions in the central
management of  economic policy, finance and planning.
Moreover, the Indonesian government did not succumb
to the temptation of imposing heavy tariffs or other
trade restrictions to protect inefficient domestic
industries. And in the late 1990s after the East Asian
crisis, it pursued serious efforts to reduce domestic
subsidies.
Regarding the country’s social development, Ascher
mentioned that Indonesia’s health indicators have lagged
behind other countries in the region, even taking into
account their relative wealth. This is due mainly to lagging
vaccination policies and understaffing in the health sector.
In education, Indonesia has been successful in enrolling
elementary school children; however, this has not been the
case with secondary education. The governmental efforts
to escalate education levels have not been backed by
corresponding budgetary commitments. In terms of
poverty reduction, Indonesia reduced the share of people
living on less than one dollar a day from 17.4 per cent in
1993 to 7.5 per cent in 2002. Since 2006/2007, positive
progress can be observed in public spending on health
and education.
In the post-Suharto era (post-1998), one of the most
distinctive strategies to channel resource wealth to social
services has been decentralization. Large portions of
centrally collected fiscal resources and social services
responsibilities have been transferred directly to the
district level. The rationale behind this was as political
(to undermine the influence of  former Suharto
adherents and to avoid corruption) as it was economic.
With decentralization a new social policy instrument,
cash transfers to poor households, has been introduced,
partly substituting for the former fuel subsidies, and
Ascher held that cash transfers constituted an
important advance over the earlier approach. In 2005,
unconditional cash transfers were paid to 19 million poor
households, and allowed domestic fuel prices to double
What stands out in the case of
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without major disturbances. More recently, these
programmes have been expanded and transformed into
conditional cash transfers with the encouragement of
the Asian Development Bank and the World Bank. The
new conditional cash transfers are modelled after similar
programmes in Latin America and make benefits
conditional on utilization of basic health and educational
services.
Finally, Ascher identified various obstacles to converting
hydrocarbon wealth into positive social outcomes and
concluded by stressing the need to overcome leakages
in channelling mineral resources into development, to
improve quality and access of  social services, and to
improve the hydrocarbon pricing policy as well as the
timing of  resource extraction. Indonesia’s
impressive development under the corrupt and
authoritarian Suharto regime demonstrated that good
macroeconomic policies can indeed make up for large
inefficiencies at the micro level.
‘Jìmí Adésínà followed with a presentation on “Mineral
Rents and Social Development in Nigeria”. He
emphasized the significant role social policy had played
in efforts to build trust and national cohesion in the
post–civil war era in the 1970s. A significant dimension
of that was financed by earnings from natural
resources—agriculture and hydrocarbons. Policies
around education and health have dominated in the
Nigerian context, illustrating the prominence of the
productive and redistributive  dimensions of social
policy in the country. Rather than an undifferentiated
picture of failure, as the orthodox literature on the
resource curse would have predicted, Adésínà described
a more complex sequence of temporal and regional
variations in Nigeria’s post-colonial experience with
natural resource wealth.
According to Adésínà, regression analysis reveals little
in cases where local contexts, historical patterns of social
relations, politics and economic management need to
be taken into account. Nigeria went through different
periods of development, with two episodes of major
success on both the economic and social policy fronts.
The first was linked to the launch of the First
Development Plan (1955–1960) by the government of
Western Nigeria, which focused on human capital,
infrastructure, support for agricultural production and
diversification of  the economy. The period was
characterized by a clear normative commitment to social
development, fiscal prudence and high-quality public
administration. Following the experience of a traumatic
civil war (1967–1970), in 1970 a Second National
Development Plan (1970–1974) was designed.
Reconstruction efforts in the decade of the 1970s went
beyond rebuilding damaged infrastructure: public policy
was seen as an effective instrument to “heal” the
national wound and to develop a sense of national
identity and cohesion. The launch of the universal
primary education programme in 1976 was made
possible by increased resources from mineral wealth.
Additionally, university education became tuition-free
and overall spending on education reached 6 per cent
of GDP in 1980. There was a similar expansion in the
field of health care.
According to Adésínà, the Nigerian example illustrated
the social returns of  these investments in terms of
positive impact on social and political stability, trust within
the polity, investment and growth. Mineral rents became
increasingly important as a financial base for these
policies.
Adésínà went on to explain how the significance of
hydrocarbon-based earning was most clearly reflected
in the Third Development Plan (1975-1980). In
response to the global oil price hike at that time,
revenues increased sevenfold. The implications for
economic development planning and social policy
financing were quite significant. Nonetheless, he
remarked, the issues around development outcomes are
much more complex than a simple reading from the
rentier state or the resource curse literature would
suggest.
From the 1980s on, Nigeria has been classified as a
rentier state; however, it is important to distinguish
between a pre- and a post-1985 period, with the period
from 1980 to 1985 being a time of policy transition. A
stabilization programme that was launched in 1982
focused on retrenchment of spending, credit and foreign
exchange rationing, and a liberalization programme
which would supposedly lift Nigeria out of mineral rent
dependence. Interestingly, more than 25 years later, the
economy still depends on mineral rents which account




witnessed a deepening of the neoliberal reform agenda
that, according to Adésínà, not only failed to fix the
economic problems of  the country, but also contributed
to a process of institutional decay and the erosion of
social trust and cohesion.
Even though corruption was not a new problem in
Nigeria, windfalls were grossly mismanaged during the
period when mineral-based revenues rose significantly.
The subsequent collapse in oil prices and revenue tipped
the economy into a grave crisis. The broad framework
of equitable access to publicly funded education and
related social provisioning enforced in the 1970s
weakened in the period of stabilization and effectively
ended under the liberalization regime. First, severe cuts
in public spending after 1982 weakened service delivery
in public health and education facilities. One example is
spending on education, which went from 6 per cent of
GDP in 1980 to 0.65 per cent in 1995. Then, the
weakening quality of  service was used as an argument
against public sector provision, paving the way for a
shift to the private sector. As a result, human
development indicators deteriorated and poverty,
measured according to national poverty lines, rose from
28 per cent in 1980 to 66 per cent in 1996.
According to Adésínà, the challenge of dependence on
natural resources is not an insurmountable condition
for a resource-rich country. The challenge has always
been to have the necessary policy leadership to be able
to break out of the natural resource enclave. Natural
resource wealth can contribute positively to financing
economic and social development and to diversifying
the economy. In the case of  Nigeria, he emphasized
that the little that was achieved in this regard between
1950 and 1970, and then between 1970 and 1980,
indicates that even more could have been achieved.
The lesson to be drawn out of the Nigerian case from
the early 1980s is that prudent management of
petroleum revenue is fundamental in protecting the
economy and the society from the external shocks that
are caused by widely fluctuating oil prices. The collapse
in social cohesion and trust, and the state of anarchy
that prevails in some parts of Nigeria, are clear examples
of the consequences of ideologically driven policy
orientations that fail to think of policy in its diverse
forms: economic, social and political. Adésínà concluded
his intervention by adding that social policy and an active
state have significant roles to play in shaping the future
of Nigeria. In particular, the transformative role of social
policy, not only relating to protection and reproduction
but also to production and redistribution, will be
fundamental in the process of economic and social
reconstruction that the country is undertaking. Indeed,
he posited, in addressing the critical issues of poverty
and inequality, social and environmental justice cannot
be achieved through the market logic or through
targeting; instead, they demand broad-based universal
access to social services and income protection
complemented by special efforts to respond to the
demands of specific groups.
Discussion
In his comments on the Indonesian case study, Terence
Gomez focused on three main points raised in the paper:
decentralization, reform of  the bureaucracy and
neoliberal reforms. Gomez said that Indonesia was an
interesting case study of a country in political transition,
offering the possibility of analysing social policies under
both authoritarian rule and the newly democratized
system. With regard to decentralization, he remarked
that the political restructuring, which largely bypassed
province governors to reach local districts, directly
empowered local policy makers to an extent that had
been unimaginable under the Suharto regime. In this
sense, Gomez pointed out, the paper presented an
extensive criticism of this process; however, it did not
examine how local governance had changed through
the reforms. Gomez suggested that an interesting angle
to the inquiry would be to study local councils and their
differing performance in terms of  delivering social
services, as well as the mechanisms of  resource
allocation, under Suharto and post-Suharto regimes. In
terms of  policy recommendations, he suggested
improving decentralization rather than recentralization.
The challenge of dependence on
natural resources is not an
insurmountable condition for a
resource-rich country. The
challenge has always been to have
the necessary policy leadership to





With regard to reform of the bureaucracy and the issue
of corruption, Gomez argued that, throughout the
reform process, problems of  administrative capacity
and service delivery had not been addressed. Problems
with delivering social services under an ineffective local
bureaucratic structure had led to institutional voids; for
Gomez, the question was whether privatization or
greater participation of the private sector, as the paper
suggests, is an appropriate solution. The capture of
institutional voids by business interests might lead to
new patron-client links and corruption, for example,
which leads to the conclusion that local governments
have to be protected from rent seekers. Concerning
the third point on neoliberal reform, Gomez raised
doubts that a retreat of the state from the oil and gas
sector would be beneficial. Poor performance of
agencies like the national oil company, Pertamina, in
Indonesia could be explained by the lack of  reform of
the bureaucracy and state-owned enterprises; this should
be a priority before allowing more foreign firms to
participate in the sector. By way of  conclusion, Gomez
suggested that the public oil company, Petronas, in
Malaysia might provide lessons for future reform of
Pertamina. Petronas, although involved in numerous
scandals and bailouts in the past, is now a thriving company.
Cyril Obi was the discussant for the Nigeria case study.
He acknowledged the substantive analysis the paper makes
on a very complicated issue and the sound critique of the
resource curse literature that Adésínà presented. With regard
to the discussion on rentier or oil states, he wondered
what the double role of the state—as gatekeeper/rent-
seeker and as producer—meant for its allocative capacity,
as well as for power relations between the state and private
producers in the sector. How are mineral rents allocated
and where does social policy come into play? Do allocation
rules change if the state is directly involved in production?
What is the capacity of the state to regulate the oil industry?
One of the main topics addressed in the Nigerian case
study was the effect of the International Monetary Fund
(IMF) structural adjustment programme. Obi mentioned
how the adjustment programme started in the oil industry,
with the removal of  subsidies. He mentioned that it would
be useful to know how this affected social policies and
redistribution. Did it make things better or worse? With
regard to Nigerian politics, he queried the reason for the
policy shift away from the social projects and the role de-
indigenization and de-nationalization played in this process.
He encouraged the author to link questions of mineral
rent management with civil society and the activities of
multinational companies. Oil corporations often engaged
in community projects and building social infrastructure,
and it would be useful to know what implications this had
for the state.
Another point that Obi regarded as important was the
specific conditions under which some states have been
more successful when diversifying their economies than
others. For example, Indonesia was able to develop its
manufacturing industry while simultaneously earning the
majority of state revenue from natural resource rents,
while Nigeria was not.
In the following plenary discussion, participants referred
to the questions of state governance and private sector
performance. In many countries, the role of  the state
had been expanded after the private sector had failed
to engage in productive investment, often because the
macroeconomic environment did not offer enough
incentives to do so. What we find in the case of  Indonesia
and Nigeria is a developmental state, but with high levels
of corruption. One participant wondered why Indonesia
had been more successful than other countries. He
suggested that one possible answer could be the fact
that Indonesia was characterized by a stable long-term
regime, whereas in Nigeria frequent governmental
changes seem to have been disruptive. An alternative
explanation could be the breakdown of the political
settlement that had existed in Nigeria up to 1979. Finally,
it was noted that decentralization of functions in
Indonesia had been accompanied by decentralization
of funding mechanisms as well. The Latin American
experience had shown that, although social services had
been transferred to lower levels in the process of
decentralization, the corresponding transfer of funding
mechanisms had often been insufficient.
In his response, Ascher referred to the difficulties of
getting comparative information about the performance
of local councils in Indonesia, as the situation was in
constant flux. However, a good assessment about the
outcomes of the decentralization process was indeed
important in order to evaluate recent social policy
initiatives that seemed to indicate a process of




doubts about the possibilities of reforming it according
to the Malaysian experience—in his view, Malaysia had
a clear advantage in terms of  governance capacity. He
then touched upon an issue that had been raised by
Obi with regard to the Nigerian case: the provision of
social services by oil multinationals. He would
characterize this as a leakage, he argued, because oil
companies did not have a comparative advantage in
social service provisioning and mostly do it in an
inefficient way.
Adésínà ended the discussion by emphasizing the
importance of governments that manage to smooth
tensions in ethnically and socially diverse contexts,
especially in post-conflict situations. In the case of
Nigeria, the First Republic had been more successful
in this sense. Social policy played a key role in this
process, whereas the subsequent dismantling of these
programmes led to institutional decay and hitherto
unknown levels of corruption.
Concluding Remarks
In the final session, research coordinator Katja Hujo
referred again to the challenges of analysing social policy
in a context of  mineral-rich countries. Thus far, she
pointed out, most of the existing literature had focused
on the study of the economic and political implications
of rents from natural resources, in particular with
respect to macroeconomic stability and democratic
governance. The role that social policy has played and
could play in harnessing the use of these rents for
development has been mostly ignored. She held that
there is a clear need for more in-depth empirical work
on the linkages between the economic, social and
political dimensions of a development path that is
strongly shaped by a primary sector like mining. She
hoped that the papers discussed at the workshop would
feed into an analytical framework that could be applied
to substantive country case studies. Research looking
at the different dimensions and policy responses of
mineral-led development in selected countries would
allow a more complex picture of this specific growth
path to be captured. Such a picture would be embedded
in a particular historical and geographical context, but it
would also allow overarching challenges and policy
lessons beyond each case to be identified.
One workshop participant emphasized that the
development dynamics in mineral-rich countries are
extremely important. Countries go through different
phases after the discovery of  minerals. Often, decisions
taken in the first five years, or lessons learned during
early periods of mineral-led growth, tend to shape the
future for decades to come, as the examples of Norway
and Chile have shown. In Norway, policies for managing
oil rents are guided by principles (the so-called
commandments) that were established early on and have
received broad support since then. Norwegian citizens
support public management of oil resources because
of widespread and strong trust in state capacity and
accountability, based on an effective tax system and
state responsibility for social services and protection.
Once we move away from developed countries like
Norway, however, it is crucial to incorporate issues of
consolidation of democracy and state building into the
analysis, as one participant remarked. Many mineral-
rich countries fare well on human development
indicators and invest in education and health, but they
often perform poorly in terms of  human rights or equity.
Social policy after the World Summit for Social
Development held in Copenhagen in 1995 has been
explicitly related to social inclusion, social relations and
gender equality. Such an approach differs from the so-
called productivist social policies that focus on human
capital investments or are centred on those groups that
are closest to the productive system, as in the case of
East Asia.
Several participants noted that it was important to
include the external environment and external actors in
the analysis, as they influence policy decisions on mineral
wealth and the overall economy, especially in poorer
countries. Southern countries are a constant laboratory
of  economic and social policies—reforms are often
based on international policy trends, as the example of
cash transfers in Indonesia demonstrates. Finally, it was
suggested, analysis of  the role of  multinational
corporations, foreign direct investment and public-
private partnerships for mineral development would





Thursday, 24 April 2008
Opening Session
9.30–9.45 Welcome and Introduction to UNRISD,
Thandika Mkandawire
9.45–10.00 Social Policy in Mineral-Rich




Session 1: Economic Challenges and
Potential in Mineral-Rich Countries
Chair—Janvier Nkurunziza
10.50–11.50 Presentat ion of the Thematic
P a p e r s
? Economic Policy in Mineral-Rich Countries—
Samuel Asfaha
? Development and Growth in Mineral-Rich
Countries—Thorvaldur Gylfason
11.50 – 12.10 Discussants—Katja Hujo and Albert Berry
1 2 . 1 0 – 1 3 . 0 0 Plenary Discussion
13.00–14.30 Lunch break
Session 2: State Capacity and Social
Policies in Mineral-Rich Countries
Chair—Yusuf Bangura
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9 . 3 0 – 1 0 . 3 0 Presentat ion of Country Papers
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Session 4: Overview Country Studies:
Indonesia and Nigeria
Chair—Samuel Asfaha
13.30–14.30  Presentat ion of Country Papers
? Mineral Wealth, Development and Social Policy in
Indonesia—William Ascher







16.00–16.20 Wrap Up and Outlook—Katja Hujo
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